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Jenkins: Toward Remaking Software Development to Secure It

ABSTRACT

Modern software development depends on tools and techniques to represent implied information processing
logic to the human engineer, relying chiefly on effortful human reasoning to best determine critical
properties of the software system. Current conceptualization, visualization and contextualization of
software in development amounts to a significant under-utilization of already limited development
resources directed to optimization, prevention, and addressing fundamental security properties of the
software system. As a step toward increasing such utilization as a basis for a global ecosystem of secure
software, this work explores and evaluates an alternative representation of software source code for the
sake of secure development, manifesting universal, critical properties of the system to enhance control of
security-determinative factors while the bulk of the properties of the system are being determined and the
costly skills of the developer are directed to the many aspects of the task.
KEYWORDS
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INTRODUCTION

With software systems bearing an increasing share in the provision of modern services, there is a spectrum
of activities aimed at the realization of secure software systems, from the more timely mitigations of
vulnerabilities during the engineering process to the “late” application of security updates to deployed
systems. With a growing set of particular instances of costly security incidents (PwC, 2020) and ongoing
vulnerabilities that are slowly addressed and costly to society (Veracode, 2021), responses have relied on
an approach which either increases the labor and costs of developers or reactively expends resources to
mitigate vulnerabilities that have already led to incidents damaging to business processes and reputation. A
well established attribute of software flaws is that the cost of repair increases as the point of intervention
advances further in the software engineering process, where less advantage can be made of the focused
talent and more diversion of resources becomes necessary.
Although the introduction of flaws into software systems is an assumed, admitted presence in modern
software engineering, the discipline has seen an evolution of alterations to software architecture, design,
implementation and maintenance that support mitigation of risk and resistance to intentional attack. At the
most systematic perspective, the use of layered architectures is one example of a design approach that
achieves an isolation of system components from each other, enforcing a controlled interface between
them and restricting unauthorized information flow. Such architectural measures set the stage for security
’from the ground up,’ but do not address the creation of exploitable flaws during the implementation of
the source code.
Modifications to software development tools and techniques for security purposes have largely focused
on overt source code phenomena and practices tied to particular vulnerabilities. Turning to more focused
interventions, manual analysis of source code for the removal of security flaws is both an effective and
significantly costly addition to the engineering process, while automated security scanning tools
experience practical limitations in performance and power of revelation that limit their application. Secure
programming has a meaningful role in a large scale secure software effort, yet requires intentional
vigilance in the observance of coding practices beyond those needed to meet software requirements.
Notably, training of software developers in secure programming techniques is a more direct attempt to
address the human element in the creation of software systems, but also represents a reduction in the
effectiveness of employment of the developer’s human resources: the developer trains to observe
practices beyond those needed for the construction of software rather than benefiting from an adjustment
to their own development paradigm and conception of the software. Existing approaches force the
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developer to apply human effort to abstractly represent the properties that are determinative of the
security of the software system in development.
The modern expansion of software into the conveyance of a wider envelope of business services must
motivate an “all hands on deck” exploration of fundamental alterations to the paradigm of secure software
development. The exploration of such alterations is necessary in order to reveal protections that enhance
the developer’s efficacy without adding ‘passes’ to the development process, protections that mitigate
vulnerabilities in a more far-reaching manner rather than leave each new attack to be addressed
separately. The widely practiced reactive approach to securing software systems follows from a
prioritization of functionality before risk, but can only attempt to prevent further damage within software
systems already exploited, especially with defenses (e.g. “patches”) that are not systematic.
The contribution, the result, of this work is a fundamental change to the development representation of the
software system in order to enable the explicit manifestation of properties that have direct influence on
the security of the deployed system, yet are not “visible” in raw source code. From the novel model,
manifestations of the key properties are derived for use as part of the visual representation of software
during development. Further, the feasibility of the novel representation and its ability to convey the
corresponding augmented security information in support of development are evaluated through the
creation of a prototype source code editor in Java.
The work presented here also acts as a step (a measured step in line with practical constraints of modern
software engineering) toward more effective development models of software that deemphasize nonfunctional aspects of the system, such as labels, in favor of properties that objectively prescribe critical
functionality. The new representation is realized as part of the software development process, where
source code text is segmented and augmented to allow effective, explicit depiction of, and reasoning
about, properties such as information flow.
The change in representation proposed here can be instructively compared to the major transition in the
construction of software systems that occurred as part of the introduction of object oriented programming
near the end of the 20th century. Where object oriented programming introduces the object as the new,
chief structural unit of work in software (yet does not alter the work done), the proposal here preserves
the functional structure of the system under development, but segments functional source code symbols to
enable representation and prioritization of properties, augmenting the system representation to explicitly
position the properties to inform development as part of the development tool set rather than in their
traditional, abstract role requiring training and cost to employ.
The advocacy for such widely applicable software development interventions additionally reflects the
responsibility for globally secure software as a shared burden. Since there is an unavoidable relationship
of reuse and dependency between modern software components (originating within the same product, or
not) and systems, the importance of bidirectional assurances of security derived from commonly
employed, general protections is demonstrated.
In the remainder of this work, the most applicable work of similar approach to the present effort is reviewed,
followed by coverage of the global software development context in which this work is born, an explanation
of the foundational principle of properties that is to replace a pure language-based conception of software,
an explanation of the feasibility of changing and augmenting the representation of software in development
for security purposes, a specification of the changes made to the developer’s software development
environment in order to capture the properties introduced, an evaluation of the feasibility of the proposed
property-based development paradigm in the form of a prototype source code editor, and finally
conclusions.
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RELATED WORK

There exists an established set of options for the intervention toward the security of software, both in
development and as deployed, but through the best efforts of the author, no significant efforts toward the
proposed degree of fundamental alterations of the development software representation for secure
development are found.
However, to address the major task of ubiquitously secure software, the spectrum of practices that support
engineering of secure software systems must be considered as a complementary combination rather than a
set of mutually exclusive, competitive categories.
Security tools provide scanning services to identify potential vulnerabilities in software systems without
continuous human intervention, yet such tools are realistically applied as assistive processes for the
human developer, and may require the creation of tool-specific analysis data as a prerequisite (Wichers et
al., 2020; NIST, 2020).
Manual effort by the human developer provides more intelligent and abstract security analysis of a
software system, yet introduces cost and falls short of the performance of automated tools. Software
scanning services such as the ample Fortify static code analyzer (MicroFocus, 2020) automate the
security analysis of software as a service, dynamically analyzing executing code, and may be
complemented with manual efforts to secure the system, such as penetration testing. With scaling and
performance now commonly delivered in cloud environments, the developer is provided with rapid
feedback on the tool’s findings and able to take corrective action.
Recent developments in the security analysis of software systems have led to the employment of
‘semantic’ reasoning in order to identify and mitigate security vulnerabilities. This form of analysis, to be
treated distinctly from syntactic and lexical analysis of code, focuses on identifying and analyzing the
meaning and intent of the expressed code statements that is not expressed in the source code. Semantic
analysis leads to the identification of patterns of dangerous code that are visible in, for example, whether
variables are defined before use, and comparing expressed types to required types.
The addition of security analysis capabilities to the GNU compiler collection (GCC, 2010) represents a
useful indicator of the penetration of such techniques into the wider creation of software. Though there
can be significant impact on compilation performance, the compiler is able to scan for a set of distinct
“bugs” such as double free of memory references and the “unsanitized” used of an index value.
Secure programming practices (Oracle, 2020; OWASP Project, 2020; Red Hat Inc., 2020), when already
constrained attention and resources are available, are employed during software development as additive
adjustments to the implementation of functional requirements, with examples found in the validation of
input data and the use of security services such as encryption, authentication and access control. Though
the benefits of secure practices with respect to security incidents are significant and clear, the practical
adherence to proper practices is limited by a justified focus on core functionality during software
development, a lack of immediate security consequences and a lack of ubiquitous training.
Security engineering addresses the mitigation of risk during the professional production of complex
software products by intervening at the architectural level, where decisions can be made to build
systematic protection ‘into’ the system with e.g. layering or code reviews, or also by applying dedicated
testing for vulnerabilities. Moving toward the organizational context, risk management can be applied to
identify and reduce the risk factors of the software project in ways that may reduce vulnerabilities.
As a representative example of efforts to alter the software development support structure in service of
more effective development, the work in (Bragdon et al., 2010) alters the containment representation of
source code, but does not adjust the representation of the code itself, allowing no opportunity to reveal the
breadth of the security-relevant properties of the software system in development.
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The work in (Xie et al., 2011) implements interactive support for secure programming within the
integrated development environment (IDE), but relies on heuristics to detect “common” security issues in
program source code. The project shares with the current work an emphasis on improving the code during
development, as well as enabling useful annotations that support the developer.
In summary, there is a body of work that aims to analyze the software system in development, in source
code, in order to identify code sequences which are judged to match a known vulnerability pattern.
However, such measures are dependent on language-specific constructs and labels, and are tied to
particular vulnerabilities. Though there is typically a set of particular categories of vulnerabilities which
are prominent (OWASP Project, 2020), new attacks continue to appear as variations that present a new
’fingerprint’ which does not match existing signatures in spite of potential similarities in strategy or
pattern.
LANGUAGE VS. PROPERTIES

A conventional, high level representation of software, for software development purposes, is the product
of an effort to represent a complex expression of logic in a manner that resembles natural language,
sufficiently for the purpose of development. However, the use of high level programming languages for
the expediency of human interpretation does not manifest a set of inherent properties that drive important
consequences of its execution, yet are not evident to visual inspection of source code.
A question beyond the scope of this work is on the general necessity of language-bound details in the
development representation of software. Although there are various practical factors that drive the
creation and maintenance of distinct programming languages, a property-based development
representation of software would be capable of an increase in efficiency through the condensing of
language-specific details into common logical operations in a unified syntax. Nevertheless, rather than
attempt to summarily discard widely used programming language environments on which vast running
software systems depend, the approach taken here is to compromise via a representation that preserves
language-bound details (keywords, syntax symbols), yet alters the structure of the presented system
enough to introduce a general structure that manifests properties within the user interface and augments
the display elements for the purpose of the manifestation of the security properties discussed here.
Information flow is a well-studied aspect of software source code and execution (Denning, 1976). The
flow of influence between data storage locations serves as an effective model of the undesirable
propagation of untrusted data and of key elements in security attacks on computer systems. The transfer
of data from restricted access storage locations that are marked as sensitive to others that are less sensitive
represents a clear security violation in military contexts and in others where information is controlled.
There are expressions of information flow which may be deduced within program source code, yet do not
exhibit explicit transfer of information between storage locations. Such implied information flow occurs
when information about a stored value a can be inferred through, for example, the effect of a
conditionally executed statement on a separately stored value b. In a statement such as if a == 0 then b =
c, the explicit information flow from storage location c to b through assignment is clear, yet conditional.
An implicit flow also exists from a to b, since the storage of the value in variable b exposes information
about the value of a that is checked in the conditional statement. In the model studied here, explicit
information flows are accounted for, while implicit flows are viewed as a direction for future study.
Information flow is revealed as a controllable property of most programming language environments that
feature programmer-managed storage, but it is not generally exposed to software developers as they work
to produce software systems which rely on such flow for the useful effect of the systems. In spite of its
relatively unmanifested role in the software development process, information flow models an enabling
factor that is a key driver of transitions in security-relevant properties that are discussed in this work.
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Supported by information flow, a complex of properties are expressed at the composition of data and
logic which is described by the function interface. The definition and call of functions is one of the
fundamental software constructs that enable the construction of large scale, robust software systems: the
function code, bearing unenforced requirements for secure operation, is reused to process unique data of
remote origin and distinct requirements for secure use. Where a function is employed, information flow
facilitates the action of multiple related, security-relevant properties, to include structure, parity and
extent (and the potential for more, to be studied).
The basis for the focus on the call interface as the chief locus of property action in this work is its
characteristic imposition of interactions between data elements and the interactions between the invoking
code and the code which is invoked. There is also a characteristic discontinuity between the intent and
safety requirements of both ’sides’ of the functional interface, leading to countless security
vulnerabilities, and revealed here to be expressed as action via properties. Beyond that, the concept of
composition of requirements is widely applicable to software constructs, opening the way for future
study.
Firstly, the parity property (Table Security Relevant Properties Captured and Manifested) describes the
state of symmetry between subsets of the data operated on by the invoked code. Commonly, parity is
required in order for the correct and secure operation of functions which rely on a ’match’ between
specifiers for parameter count and the number of actual parameters passed in. Mismatches between
specifiers and parameter values in calls to format functions can result in undefined and insecure program
behavior. Such phenomena is famously observed in format string security vulnerabilities, which have
demonstrated the capability to leak information and execute unauthorized code (OWASP, 2020;Teso,
2001).
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Property

Description

Security Phenomena
Captured

Practical Examples

Information
Flow
(explicit)

Propagation of
information
from source
storage
location to
destination

Integrity violations via the
transfer of information to
protected data repositories,
confidentiality violations
via the transfer of restricted
access information to
unauthorized repositories

Sabotage of data, data
corruption,
information leak

Composition
of Parity

Imposed
interaction
between data
items via their
mutual
presence or
absence

Potential integrity,
confidentiality and
availability failures due
to the absence of correct,
required data item for
each required input

Format string
vulnerability, e.g. C
printf function

Composition
of Structure

Imposed
interaction of
data with data,
via a structural
or topological
operation

Potential integrity,
confidentiality and
availability failures due
to the use of incorrect data

Composition
of Extent

Imposed
interaction of
magnitudes of
data with data

to interact with data as part
of structural operation

Potential integrity,
confidentiality and
availability violations
due to the transfer of data
from source to
destination, where the
violations are a result of
unmatched safety
requirements between
data and interface

Indexing
vulnerabilities, e.g.
use of out of bounds
index. Attacks with
crafted input, e.g.
parsing

Buffer overflow
vulnerability,
overwrite of data in
memory through lack
of bounds checking

Table 1: Security Relevant Properties Captured and Manifested

The structural property captures the use of incoming data by the function to impose spatially partitioning
operations on data or functionality. A prominent example of the structural property in action is in the
indexing of sequence variables, where a numeric (or other) data value ’selects’ the particular data element
to access or process. The use of unvalidated data to index a sequence data structure is a recognized
pathway for multiple attacks.
An extent property is visible in the relative magnitudes of the data that is made by the function to interact.
In the implementation activity of software engineering, it is the information flow that enables the potential
extent interaction which is visible for analysis. The measurement of the action of information flow
through extent can be fully measured only with analysis of executing software, since the true relationship
between magnitudes is defined only when data is in use. Still, the incompatibility between the extents
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presented by actual data and the requirements for secure reuse of the function directly describes the
conditions for the endlessly applied buffer overflow attack (Aleph1, 1996).
That there are meaningful properties of the actions implied by source code is evident to cursory analyses.
However, existing strategies for exposing such properties to the software engineer are not efficient or
scalable, requiring for example new analyses of the same codebase, with separate development efforts
aimed at addressing the consequences of software failures. Ultimately, the increase in valuable
information obtained by the manifestation of properties justifies the general re-representation of source
code in a property-exposing form.
REMAKING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURE DEVELOPMENT

While secure software is inarguably a critical goal for today’s digitally-driven services, there are clear
limitations to an approach in which each software vulnerability is analyzed to the exclusion of others and
addressed with reactive, tailored defenses. As successful and necessary as a patch for a specific software
vulnerability is, it is applicable to the identified flaw and does not inherently apply even to related
vulnerabilities. Notably, attackers successfully renew their attacks with minor adjustments to techniques
and implementations.
A more general approach to increasing the feasibility of secure software development is through a
combination of re-representation of the logic to be implemented and the addition of augmented
information that manifests security-relevant properties. The high level representations of program logic
used in modern programming languages take the form of recognizable natural language symbols,
reducing the burden of the developer’s task in directly reasoning about abstract logic. However, such
representations also demonstrate the amenability of program logic to re-representation, an opening to
further adjustments toward a new baseline of secure software in development.
Conventional software development code representations and practices are a significant under-utilization
of time, effort, and other resources, and an under-application of parallelism in terms of the overtness of
software properties that are critical to the software system in production. There is a way forward to an
increased utilization of the valuable human resources engaged in software development through
alternative representations of the software system that ‘prefer’ properties rather than localized labels,
exposing properties that aid the classification process of identifying vulnerable code.
The composition of distinct sets of source code constructs (and their implied execution effects) is a key
construct which enables the effective application of a language-agnostic, property based software
development methodology. The concept of composition can be applied to the most fundamental
constructive technique of software development, the specification and call of external procedures, though
its application is not limited to this aspect.
The definition of, and call to, reusable procedures is a fundamental enabler of the construction of
complex, maintainable software systems. A trade-off of control for expediency takes place in the
engineering of modern software products, in which the developer’s own implementation directives are
replaced with the ability to call a procedure implemented to honor a ’contract’ of work done with the
incoming data.
A key realization of composition is at the function interface, where arriving data carries with it a set of
requirements for safe use, in terms of its extent, its parity with the remaining data items, and the
imposition of structural interaction between separate data items by the function instructions. Thus, the
function interface composes two potentially disjoint sets of security requirements, leading to an
opportunity for the violation of the intent of the program author.
Importantly, the actions modeled by the security properties, and the attacks which are derived from action
through the properties, are only truly realized during the execution of the software system. As a result,
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software development with a property representation of a software system is best aimed at constraining
undesirable property ‘pathways’ in the source code prior to program execution. The program resulting
from such development disallows uncontrolled pathways through the security properties, and thus
prevents the attacker from constructing security violations in terms of sequences of property state
changes.
The judgements of the software developer, when informed by a view that exposes and prioritizes key
properties which normally require intentional effort to reason about, benefit from a new baseline in
representational accuracy of a complex system under construction. The increased accuracy is reflected in
the manifestation of the properties that implement the intent of the author and determine security, rather
than merely in terms of the labels of a single language system. As a practical matter, such an advancement
can be realized by, for example, useful visual indicators of dangerous property disparities displayed
within the development environment.
For the sake of exploration, a valid, alternative approach for the augmentation of software development
practice for security purposes is the creation of a new ’special purpose’ programming language
environment that enforces additional requirements with the goal of reducing the likelihood of security
vulnerabilities. Apart from the significant effort involved in such an endeavor and the obstacles to
adoption among a context of legacy software, such a task would recreate with a new set of labels the
familiar limitations of conventional programming languages in the face of security threats. An
exploitation of a program implemented in such a language abuses its characteristic capabilities and
restrictions, and defenses envisioned during development are traditionally expressed as alterations within
the label system of the language, rather than the transformations in universal properties that truly
determine the security of modern software.
In summary, a property-based representation of software for the purpose of secure development will
expose and prioritize security properties that are directed by the code expressed yet not overtly
manifested, and it will further augment the development task with sufficient information for the developer
to curtail uncontrolled property transitions.
RE-REPRESENTING SECURITY DURING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

Taking the construct of composition as a guiding principle for the support of secure software
development, a property-based software development source code representation can meaningfully
expose indicators of security property state changes that are implied by source code in development. The
function call is a key interface at which the composition of these properties acts, and at which our novel
software representation exposes this complex for the benefit of the software developer toward
implementation better reflective of the process in progress.
The goal of a property-based software development representation of software must be a concise model
that manifests the ’pathways’ for security-relevant flows and discontinuities, but avoids obscuring the
remaining properties that may be of interest to other development views. For the sake of generality, the
representation of software is best formed in a property-agnostic way that assumes a granularity
appropriate for the individual elements of statements which can exhibit information flow or composition.
Achieving such generality is possible through the segmentation of code statements at least to the extent
that information flow sources and destinations are given exclusive positioning.
Moving to the particular security properties introduced, the first property that must be represented,
information flow from a source storage location to a set of others within a code scope or “block”, can
reveal the passage of information to unauthorized (or insufficiently privileged) carriers or repositories of
that information. Unauthorized information flow represents a violation of the confidentiality principle,
among the three of the classical CIA triangle. A key manifestation of information flow during software
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development is, given a storage label, a visual indication of all transfers of information from the referrent
of that label to other locations, including indirect flows, within the block.
Parity reflects the degree to which separate references, composed by code to interact, bear mutually
present data. Parity can be indicated in the development view by the visible distinction between a data
parameter string that contains a probable specifier pattern and the remaining data elements that are
required to be present to ’match’ the specifier parameter. To maximize the generality of the parity
information displayed, the parity analysis of parameter strings is approached as an abstract pattern
repetition search, using a maximum likelihood detection strategy in which the pattern most repeated is
chosen as the probable repetition pattern.
Structural interaction between data entering the function can be indicated with suggestive symbols placed
with the augmented parameter representation. Notably, the important indication of cross-parameter
structural interaction is directional, and symbols should be sufficiently expressive for this purpose.
Information flow is also directional, and can be similarly indicated within the parameter representation by
symbols that illustrate the direction, source and destination of flow between function parameters.
A unifying interface concept for the manifestation of unsafe composition is the visual distinction between
the elements of the composition that would exhibit similarity in a secure configuration. A standardized
awareness of the presence of such interactions before the system is tested is a necessary prerequisite for
informed development of secure software. To indicate the information flow between function parameters,
an appropriate approach is to augment the representation of the function call element within the statement
by adding a compact representation of all parameters that provides a directional indicator to indicate, for
each parameter p, which other parameters are recipients of information flow from p.
Considering the property-based development representation advocated here in relation to existing
approaches to the construction of secure software, the present approach either advantageously provides
support earlier in the lifecycle of the software system, or reduces the reasoning and classification burden
placed on the developer seeking to mitigate vulnerabilities. Further, this work advances efforts toward an
entirely general representation of security-relevant phenomena during development, which is applicable
to essentially all software systems to be built.
Rather than scanning for “top 10” vulnerabilities or variations of studied vulnerabilities, the properties
manifested in the present work can capture precursors to entire categories of attacks, and developers
benefit from their overt representation as part of a holistic view during the implementation process. The
actual mitigation of vulnerabilities is left to the human developer, given that alterations to the system
source code are required. Here, a comparative analysis of property based development relative to existing
work is conducted.
In comparison to the present work, manual effort by the human developer provides more intelligent and
abstract security analysis of a software system, and security testing of deployed software systems can
clearly mitigate vulnerabilities, yet the resources consumed by adding developer effort are significant,
both during development and after deployment. These forms of alterations to the engineering process can
contribute to the reduction of vulnerabilities, but remain part of an intentional effort that must be
employed uniquely to each project: it cannot be employed as a new ‘baseline’ of security support apart
from the development effort.
Relative to manual intervention during or after development activities, a property-based model of
development acts as a transfer of cost from human resources used for representational effort and
classification to an ‘up front’ cost for the implementation and adoption of the model within development
tools and practices. However, such a transfer is not complete, since the vulnerability classification task,
though reduced in degree, still requires an intelligent assessment of risk based on the unique presentation
of property effects of the present software system. The property-based development approach
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nevertheless provides a ‘baseline’ of increased security, since the developer’s challenging classification
task begins with augmented support.
Risk management offers principles and software project practices that can objectively identify project
risks earlier, and may ‘save’ a software project. There exists in the discipline of software engineering an
interest in positioning risk management as an early, guiding set of processes to reduce project costs and
support success (Boehm, 1991). Risk management, as applied to software engineering, aims to coherently
and precisely identify key project risk factors, preventing them from becoming specified and implemented
to build threats to success into the product. One example of such a risk is in the case of faulty
requirements admitting the use of insecure software features.
Although project management level intervention is not attempted by the present work, risk management
can be considered complementary to property-based development. While risk management serves to
prevent unknown risks (including security threats) from impacting on the project’s success at an
organizational level, intervening in the implementation activity (as is advocated here) instead prioritizes
the developer’s role in the most effective and efficient use of their human resources in reasoning with the
security properties of the complex system in development and avoiding the introduction of risk.
Software testing can be applied during the development in a way that supports the security of the
produced system, but can also be applied in dedicated security testing (Sommerville, 2016). Software
testing is able to increase software quality and prevent flaws from remaining in software systems to be
exploited by attackers, yet adds costly activities to the development process as quality increases, and is
subject to all limitations of the software engineering process. After all, an accepted phenomena in
software engineering is the increase in cost necessary to achieve highly dependable software systems that
resist attack.
Achieving secure software systems by ‘patching’ systems after deployment enjoys a perverse benefit of
the information about how a vulnerability or flaw is exploited, yet clearly does not represent a
development intervention, does not minimize significant potential costs of addressing damage to business
processes, reputation and services, and does not ease the complex classification and mitigation task of the
human developer. On the other hand, the property based approach aims to intervene during the
development process, and provide a more secure ‘starting point’ in development at the current view of the
code.
Static security analysis of source code (Stefanović, 2020) is a major, modern approach to producing
secure software, and can be considered complementary to the work proposed here, in that such analysis
places the focus on the software system in its development activity. Static analysis involves the manual or
automated processing of the software source code with the goal of revealing security vulnerabilities. The
use of software tools for static analysis of source code (NIST, 2020 ;Wichers et al., 2020) has achieved
varying levels of performance, and characteristic inclusion of false positives in warnings to the developer
(Scanlon, 2018). Due to the various limitations of scanning tools, developers are not likely to extract the
optimal benefit from them (Jamil, ben Othmane, Valani, AbdelKhalek and Tek, 2020; Thomas,
Tabassum, Chu and Lipford, 2018).
Software security scanning services such as Fortify static code analyzer (MicroFocus, 2020) and
(Veracode, 2020) provide automated, external analysis of software systems, identifying code sequences
that exposes the system to risk and threat. With the use of such tools come the limitations of external
analysis which can ’see’ only what is evident in code, missing semantic details and any benefits of
alternative developer-facing development representations of the software system.
Although static analysis can be performed with automated tools that execute at machine speed as often as
needed, the breadth of the vulnerabilities that can be detected in an automated scan is limited to the
capabilities of machine (not human) intelligence and the representational power of the source code,
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resulting in tools typically being applied in a supporting role for security analysts working to locate and
mitigate flaws.
Static analysis does not change the nature of the support available to the developer as the source code is
developed, and does not reveal or expose the key fundamental properties that influence the security of the
developed system, properties advocated here as central to the way forward in tool-supported, secure
software development.
Thus, the limitations of static code analysis in comparison to the present work are categorical: the model
proposed here directly alters the development representation of software to expose security-critical
properties and augments the representation with development support to reason with these properties,
while static analysis analyzes the source code ‘as is’, revealing problems that are evident to software
based intelligence. The recognition of vulnerable code patterns by static analysis is dependent upon an
accumulated, costly experience with past security violations that are constructed from effects of the
properties discussed in this work.
Admitting the common approach of intervention during development in (Xie et al., 2011) and the current
work, the interactive static code security analysis enabled by the ASIDE project is an important point of
comparison. The project implements developer support for adaptable awareness of common security
problems in the development environment tool, realized in an Eclipse plugin. An example of the
application of ASIDE to a security vulnerability is the automatic recognition of the absence of validation
for an input data item: the tool generates applicable Java source code, using standardized libraries, which
can be added by the developer.
Although such interactive, in-development security refactoring clearly is capable of identifying code of
concern and facilitating mitigation, the approach, further developed in (Zhu, 2014), is subject to false
positive warnings that would be expected from a software-based classification capability, and does not
fundamentally alter the representation of the software system toward secure systems. The present work
does not attempt software-based classification, but advances a model of software that is properly
representative of security-critical properties reasoned with during development, in order to increase the
effectiveness of human developer classification, where true security-expertise resides.
As reflected in the plugin implemented in the work of Zhu et al., development tools such as Eclipse
demonstrate not only the current state of support for general customizations of the development process,
but also the amenability of development frameworks and tools to augmentation with security-relevant
functional support, on which the practicability of the present work relies.
Secure programming (Bishop, 2006) is an approach to the production of secure software systems that is
more directly similar to the present work than static code analysis, in that the intervention is applied to the
development paradigm, rather than through the application of automatic analysis. The use of proper input
validation to sanitize data originating from untrusted sources is one example of a programming practice
that mitigates vulnerabilities in which input interfaces are exploited.
While secure programming can be taught to developers in training and employed to significant benefit by
professional engineers to prevent well-known categories of vulnerabilities, ongoing training, resources
and vigilance beyond the fundamental efforts of constructing working software are necessary to realize
the benefits. In comparison to the present work, secure programming represents an allocation of tasks of
arbitrary size to the developer, requiring the ongoing application of patterns to programming scenarios
that present uniquely.
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Costs

Software
Lifecycle

Developer Classification Effort

Software
Testing

Development
activity resource
consumption

During
development

Developer classification of
incorrect or faulty code

Patching

Software
maintenance
costs, security
testing,
organizational
incident response

After
deployment

Developer classification of
insecure code

Code
analysis

Ongoing tool
costs, Developer
verification

During
development

Partially automated classification,
developer effort for confirmation

Secure
Programming

Ongoing
Training,
Developer
resources

During
development

Developer classification of
insecure code

PropertyBased
Development

Initial
development tool
implementation
and adoption

During
development

Significantly automated

Table 2: Interventions for Software Security

In context, the present model prioritizes properties which increase coverage of security vulnerabilities
rather than requiring an intentional, abstract and arbitrarily complex classification process, the scale of the
classification can be reduced and uniform adjustments applied to mitigate vulnerabilities (see
Interventions for Software Security and Interventions for Software Security).
As depicted for key security vulnerability categories in table Table 3: Comparison of Developer Action,
By Vulnerability Category, a property-based development model of software enables the transformation
of the developer action from, at best, assisted identification with developer manual mitigation to
significantly automated identification with supported mitigations that apply to entire categories of
vulnerabilities.
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Secure
Programming

Sabotage of data,
data corruption,
information leak

Format string
vulnerability, e.g.
C printf function

Indexing, parsing
vulnerabilities,
e.g. use of out of
bounds index or
crafted input

Buffer overflow
vulnerability,
memory
overwrite

Static Code Analysis

Property-Based
Development

Intentional
developer training
and practice for
removal

Scanning for explicit
flows with human
intervention for each
flow

Automated flow
identification,
developer
mitigation (e.g.
disabling of flows
not specified in
requirements)

Developer training
and vigilance to
avoid dangerous
dual channel
functions

Scanning for
function usage, with
human intervention
for verification of
vulnerability

Automated
identification of
parity risk,
developer
mitigation (e.g.
forced parity)

Developer training
and practice to avoid
use of unchecked
index values or
validate index
values

Scanning for sourcecode visible, unsafe
index uses

Automated
identification of
indexing
relationship,
developer
mitigation

Developer training
and practice to
implement bounds
checking

Language-based
pattern scanning ,
developer
verification and
unique mitigation
per instance

Automated
identification of
information flow
and extent
relationship,
developer
mitigation

Table 3: Comparison of Developer Action, By Vulnerability Category

The feasibility of a property-based model of development is supported by potential implementations in
the context of any programming language, given the universal nature of the security properties given
priority in this work. Information flow, for instance, usefully models dangerous flows of influence
between data, regardless of the language system used to direct the uses of the data in variables. The
properties directed at the site of the invocation of a function remain in force independently of the data
types, calling conventions or parameter passing in place for the programming environment.
With regard to the adoption of property based development, mass application is possible via the bearing
of a one-time cost of implementation of the model within community-developed software development
tools such as Eclipse, as demonstrated by the plugin additions described in (Zhu, 2014). Since the
properties are inherent in the useful action of all modern software, the need to support unique
visualizations or representations for each security concern is avoided, requiring only a useful visualization
of each property of interest and potential indicators for a limited number of function parameters.
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The use of a property-agnostic visual arrangement can be tuned to preserve the overt, language and labelspecific details of program statements to the degree necessary to maintain development recognition to the
prevailing needs of the state of the discipline, and the prioritization of properties does not create
significant compatibility issues with structure in programming languages that support segment-able code
statements. Since the literal source code contents are preserved, computation of property information is
largely a one-time cost, and the source code representation can be augmented with visually concise
indicators, no significant degradative impact on the speed of development is expected.
In summary, the property-based development representation does not force the developer to train to
expose to reasoning key properties that influence software security, but faithfully positions such
properties in view during the process of their direction by the developer. Without direct representation of
properties during development, developers must unnecessarily train and exert effort to manifest them,
consuming project resources at a disadvantage to avoid the dangerous direction of such properties,
leading to vulnerabilities.
A PROOF-OF-CONCEPT PROTOTYPE PROPERTY-BASED SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SOURCE CODE
EDITOR

For the evaluation of the feasibility and efficacy of a property-based, security augmenting software
representation, a proof of concept, prototype software development source code editor, JPSCE, is
implemented in the modern JavaFX graphical framework, for use with the Java programming language.
Since the properties and constructs studied in this work are applicable to essentially all modern software
development approaches, the possibility of the addition of support for other programming languages
follows from the demonstration here, but is considered a secondary focus here and a topic for potential
future work.
Importantly, as an early evaluative measure for a novel model of software, JPSCE is not (and cannot be)
an assessment of property based development in practical use or of a secure development software tool,
the former being an undertaking that can be envisioned only in future work and the latter out of scope.
Fundamental software source code editing functionality is supported in the prototype, to include the
addition, transformation and deletion of source code lines, whether the modification of individual
statement elements or entire source code lines. Editing of individual source code line elements, possible
via the user of a separate editable text field per element, requires the use of an update button functionality
to regenerate the full code element representation to take the modifications into account, and a save
button writes the current status of the code to long term storage. Bulk editing of an entire source code line
is possible with an editable text field at the horizontal end of each ’row’ of code elements which construct
the code statement. A selection of screen shots of JPSCE in operation is presented here in figures 1-5 in
an appendix.
JPSCE places source code statement elements in a grid arrangement in order to expose properties in a
manner that is both orderly, and agnostic to properties of interest to the developer. Information flow is an
example property which requires the separation of statement elements such as operators and storage
labels. The scale of subdivision of traditional code statements must be agnostic to language and property.
The exposure of information flow within code blocks is made possible on demand, relative to a single
flow source of choice, via the use of event-driven programming and clickable element boxes. A click
applied to a code element for a statement within a block, if the code element is a potential information
flow source (a storage location label), triggers an updated colored indication of the other storage labels
that receive information flow from the source.
The representation of the method call is an abstract representation that includes not only the original,
editable call statement code, but a representation of the composition interaction effects of the parameters
to the call, and also a hide-able, contained, scrollable display of the function implementation (if such
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implementation is accessible). The augmentations to the source code call are placed with the element
holding the textual name of the called function.
With the call representation constructed as a vertical box, the upper most container is reserved for the
definition that is matched to the current statement’s call, if such a definition is directly accessible in the
present source code file (as it is tied to the questionable availability of outside source code, processing
remote definitions is left for future study). The method definition, held within a fixed size, scrollable
window, can be shown or hidden with double click actions applied to the function name element in the
source code line.
The container second from the top in the function name element representation includes visual
representations of each actual parameter, with augmented indicators for the display of security-relevant
properties. Finally, the vertically lowest element in the three container method name representation
displays the method name, implemented to receive double click events for toggle of visibility of any
locally available definition.
Within the second container, dedicated to parameter representation, the visualization of parity is
implemented as color difference within the parameter that is concluded via analysis to most probably
contain a specifier pattern that imposes parity in the call. Structural interaction between parameters is
indicated with common indexing symbols, square brackets placed around the parameter used to index
with the proposed sequence that is indexed to the left of the brackets.
Given that conventional software development, for various practical reasons previously mentioned, relies
on a set of competing source code language representations, a lack of an objective, property-focused
representation forces the initial analysis of language-based elements in order to reveal meaningful
property-based effects as part of the development display. As discussed, the argued compromise between
support for modern programming languages and efforts to generalize secure development requires that
JPSCE preserve the target language string content, yet change the granularity and layout of code elements
to support property-based representation.
As a demonstration of the feasibility of a property-based mode of source code development, JPSCE
implements features that expose information flow and security-relevant aspects of source code interface
constructs. Information flow is exposed in the characteristic flow of data from data sources (e.g. Java
reference variables) in source code, and can be revealed on demand by user action upon a particular code
element that is a potential information flow source. Information flow is currently implemented within the
scope of code blocks, which indirectly reflects information flow interactions between data sources
entering the method and data storage locations processed within the method body.
In line with the goals of the presented theory and model of software in this work, JPSCE does not attempt
security scanning of existing source code, a task implemented by numerous tools referenced, but instead
implements a novel representation of the software system in development that is representative of key
properties that influence its security, and augments the representation with information that manifests
such properties in a way that enables informed, holistic development with improved security properties.
While the property-based representation demonstrated here enables a baseline of increased attention and
awareness of security-relevant factors, the large landscape of existing programming language
environments that are used to express today’s software systems must be acknowledged. Further, in the
short term, the coalescence of programming languages toward a unified, domain independent option is not
realistic. Thus, this demonstration does not discard information locked to programming language
constructs and labels, preserving it within the flexible, element-based representation, though the
expendability of unique language details is a worthy matter for future discussion.
JPSCE embodies the model and focus of a property-based view of software in development,
demonstrating the capability to expose entirely general information that nevertheless allows informed
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development, revealing key interactions that act as ’pathways’ to security vulnerabilities, independent of
particular variations of attack that appear in concrete code patterns.
CONCLUSION

In this work, a novel model for the representation of software systems under construction has been
presented, and beyond that an evaluation of the model for the support of secure software development. A
software system in development has been revealed to be amenable to representation as a sequence of
implied information flows, acting through the composition of security requirements and expression of
particular properties.
A practical demonstration of the fundamental capabilities enabled by the proposed representation and
augmented development view has been presented. This development prototype demonstrates the
feasibility of the application of the novel representation toward property-based development supported by
awareness of properties which underlie all software systems. Such a property-based development process
reveals the power of key security properties, information flow as a representative, well-understood
example, to uniquely expose information that indicates the possibility of security vulnerabilities.
The composition of software based action with data, and the properties that are expressed at the call
interfaces that direct such composition, have been revealed as key points at which to intervene during
development to mitigate the introduction of vulnerabilities, if the full scope of relevant information is
provided to the developer.
Left to future work are considerations of the expansion of the augmented development process to other
programming environments, and the exploration of additional properties that may have more to offer a new
standard of assisted, secure software development. The detection and manifestation of implicit information
flows are another avenue for future exploration.
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Appendix
FIGURES

Figure 1: JPSCE User Interface

Figure 2: Information Flow Indicators
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Figure 3: Function Call Parameter Parity Visualization

Figure 4: Function Call Parameter Structural Interaction Indicator

Figure 5: Toggled Visibility of Available Definition for Called Function
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Sample Java Input File

import java.util.Scanner ;

//comment
import java.io.File ;
public class input{
private static String key ;
private static String imgfn ;

public static void f ( int a , int b ) {
int c = a ;
b=c;
}
public static void f2 ( int ... a ) {
int c = a [ 0 ] ;
int b = c ;
int d = 2 ;
int e = b ;
int j = c ;
}
public static void f3 ( int [ ] e , int g ) {
int c = e [ g ] ;
}
public static void f4 ( int a , int b ) {
a=b;
}
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public static void f5 ( String fmt , int ... a ) {
;
}
/**
* The main method is only needed for the IDE with limited
* JavaFX support. Not needed for running from the command line.
*/
public static void main ( String [ ] args ) {
//read in a key password
int x = 2 , y = 3 ;
int [ ] z = new int [ 4 ] ;
f2 ( x , y ) ;
f3 ( z , y ) ;
f4 ( x , y ) ;

//System.out.printf("%d %d", 2,4);
f5 ( "%d%d" , 2 , 4 ) ;
Scanner s = new Scanner ( System.in ) ;
Scanner s2 = s ;
System.out.println( "Enter an image file name on a line" ) ;
imgfn = s.nextLine ( ) ;
}
}
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